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PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING MORALE IN THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

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SUMMARY

The German Armed Forces, in National Socialist Germany, are the most active sector of a military "front" which includes the entire nation. The entire policy of the Nazi Revolution has aimed to prepare the nation for war: militarily, economically and psychologically. Army morale therefore emerges from the broader matrix of civilian morale. The Armed Forces are, in an important sense, the military units of the Nazi Party.

Morale-building procedures in the German Armed Forces begin long before the period of compulsory military service in the life-career of the individual soldier. The State, the Military, and the Party Schools combine with the Nazi Youth Organizations to prepare the young recruit for his eventual soldierly role. After he is in the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force, a host of Party organizations contribute directly or indirectly to his well-being. A relentlessly enforced penal code suppresses all subversive activity.

Within the Armed Forces morale problems are handled with greater acumen than in the last war. Men are scientifically sorted out and promoted according to their abilities; officers and men, having shared, in many cases, the same pre-military as well as military training, respect each other as proven comrades; informal social control mechanisms reinforce the basic soldier's code; fine equipment, training and welfare services foster confidence and good will; the daily regimen is lightened by judicious dosages of wine, women and song; feelings of unity with the home front are kept alive by thoughtful Party officials; and the soldiers' minds are permeated by a persistent propaganda logic which makes the war seem at the same time inexorable, humane and heroic.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of morale-building procedures in the German Army has already been treated, from several points of view, in documents and publications readily available to U. S. Government officials. The survey of literature on German Psychological Warfare published by the Committee for National Morale in New York (1941) is by now rather widely known, and certain implications of German procedures for American Army practice have been summarized by Lt. Col. F. E. Gillette in the current (April 1942) issue of the C. & G. S. S. Military Review as well as by Ansbacher, Harrell and Churchill in the Psychological Bulletin of June 1941. Two reports from the U. S. Military Attache in Berlin are devoted almost entirely to this topic: "German Military Leadership," a 47-page digest of German writings (Report No. 17,717, November 18, 1940); and "German Recreational Services in the Theater of Operations" (Report No. 18,290, May 19, 1941). The Military Intelligence Division of the U. S. Army summarized some of the procedures in its Tentative Lessons Bulletin No. 64, November 4, 1940: "Morale Methods in the German Army." Considerable light is thrown on the problem by certain sections of the Handbook on German Military Forces prepared by the U. S. War Dept. (TM 30 - 450, December 17, 1941). Finally, for the reader of German, copious materials are to be found in military journals like Deutsche Wehr or the Militär-Wochenblatt, in the various editions of the Army Training Manual (Der Dienstunterricht im Heere), and in official handbooks such as the Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch, the Jahrbuch der Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, or the Jahrbuch des Deutschen Heeres. Further special sources are indicated in the Bibliography.

It has not been the aim of the present report to reproduce or even to summarize all the detailed information in these sources on the subject of morale-building procedures in the German Army. That would require a small volume: a Special Services Supplement to the Handbook on German Military Forces. Nor has the aim been to evaluate the procedures. The present aim is merely to organize the available information and to indicate the principal sources.

PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING MORALE IN THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

I. PRE-MILITARY TRAINING AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES

The well-known military traditions of Germany have been exploited by the National Socialist regime in their program of national "restoration." The German people have been called upon to do their part in the present war, which is uniformly presented to them as a fateful struggle for national existence forced on Germany by a degenerate, but crafty and ruthless enemy.

A. Military Obligations

For purposes of national defense the entire population has been mobilized. All men, even in peacetime, are "obligated to perform military service" (wehrpflichtig). In wartime all men and women are in addition "obligated to serve their country" (zur Dienstleistung für das Vaterland verpflichtet).1/ The following categories are used to classify all males over 18 in terms of military obligation:

(1) The military obligation (Wehrpflicht) proper applies only to those between 18 and 45 (March 31st after 45th birthday). Those below 18 may be given pre-military training by various Party organizations.

(2) Active Military Service lasts two years, usually between the ages 20-22 but sometimes begins at 18. It is preceded by 6 months of Labor Service.

(3) The Reserve consists of those who have served their Active Military Service and who are younger than 35 (March 31st after 35th birthday). The Reserve and those in Active Service are together called the Standing Army.

(4) The Substitute Reserve (Ersatzreserve) consists of men 18-35 who have not qualified for Active Military Service.

(5) Former members of the Standing Army aged 35-45 are the Landwehr.

(6) Former members of the Standing Army over 45 are the Landsturm.

1/ Der Dienstunterricht im Heere, 1941, p. 28.

(7) The Reserve and the Landwehr are "on leave" from active service.

(8) A Volunteer (Freiwilliger) is a man over 18 who has not been called for active service and who is admitted on his own request.

B. Nationalistic Indoctrination

Below the age of 18 both boys and girls are given a thoroughly nationalistic orientation not only in Party organizations like the Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls, as well as Party controlled schools and academies, and in military training institutions, but by the whole public education system, including general cultural influences such as the Press, the Cinema and the Radio as well as the State schools and universities. One of the main tenets of National Socialist policy has been that the German nation must be so prepared for war that the home front will not "let the army down." As stated in the 1941 National Socialist Year-Book:

> "In peacetime the Führer and his Party have created national unity based on National Socialism. In wartime the Party can thus remedy the weaknesses which rendered fruitless all the achievements of German soldiers in the World War . . ."1/

The effectiveness of this Party public education program can be envisaged when one notes that it covers every household in Greater Germany, as well as in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Every 40 to 60 households are organized into a Block, under a Block-Leader; every 4 to 8 Blocks constitute a Cell, under a Cell-Leader. Training in Party viewpoints is given by "more than 28,000 Party Training Offices (Schulungsämter) and Party Commissioners."2/

C. Military Morale-Building Organizations in the Party

The principle branches or special organizations sponsored by the Party whose work is directly concerned with military morale are the following:

(1) SA : Sturmabteilungen (Storm Troopers);

(2) SS : Schutzstaffeln (Elite Guard)

1/ P. 182.

2/ Ibid, p. 179.

(3) NSKK : NS.-Kraftfahrkorps (NS Motor Corps);

(4) NSFK : NS.-Fliegerkorps (NS Flying Corps);

(5) HJ : Hitler-Jugend (Hitler Youth);

(6) RAD : Reichsarbeitsdienst (Labor Service);

(7) DAF : Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front);

(8) KdF : Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy);

(9) Hauptamt fur Kriegsopfer (Central War Victims Office).

1. Role of the SA.1/ By a law of January 19, 1939, the SA was directed to take over all the "pre-military and post-military training of German manhood." Men qualified to perform military service over 17 years of age were formed into SA-Jung-Wehrmannschaften and required to compete for the SA-Military-Insignia. The aim was to provide the Army with the largest possible reserve of "mentally, physically and militarily trained young men."

At the outbreak of war, September 1, 1939, this program came to an abrupt halt in its original form, since 65 per cent of all SA-Men and 80 per cent of all SA-Leaders were called up for service (as individuals, not as units) in the Armed Forces (mostly in the Army). The reduced training staff not called up (the so-called Heimat-SA) was nevertheless able to continue a good part of the work, concentrating on men over 18 not yet enrolled for formal military training, whose term would be correspondingly shortened by the extent of their "pre-military" service. The SA also took over the task of introducing older men to military service who had missed being trained because of the Treaty of Versailles, as well as directing "refresher training" for past trainees not called up for active duty. By the spring of 1940 there were over 1,500,000 trainees in both "pre-military" groups despite the "voluntary" character of the work, which had to be done solely on Sundays and evenings.

The SA trainers aim to teach the fundamentals of infantry skills, signalling, first-aid and cavalry, and especially to inculcate the "military attitude," so that "civilian habits of mind may be overcome even before regular military training begins."

In addition to this important military training work the Heimat-SA makes the following contributions to the war

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1/ Ibid, pp. 183-190.

effort, all of which directly or indirectly serve to maintain morale in the armed forces:

(a) they continue their own military training program;

(b) they continue their personal professional or business duties;

(c) they continue their general Party obligations: care for families of service men, agricultural assistance (Landhilfe), scrap-collecting, distribution of ration cards, blackout control and assistance to those needing help during blackouts (such as invalids), etc.;

(d) they directly assist the armed forces by controlling military traffic, performing sentry duty, donating military equipment, guarding war prisoners, doing construction work, providing transportation and housing for the army, and serving as blood-donors.

2. Role of the SS.1/ The SS, in contradistinction to the SA, has its own units in the armed forces, wearing a distinctive black uniform. These units of what is known as the Waffen-SS are recruited directly from the Regular-SS (Allgemeiner-SS) their officers from two special training institutions called "Junker-Schools" (at Tölz and Braunschweig). The SS also maintains various other training schools (such as the SS-Cavalry School at Hamburg), while it supplies all the teachers for the twenty-two National Political Academies or Napoli (Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten).

The technically non-military branches of the SS perform special tasks closely connected with national defense (such as the resettlement of Volksdeutsche, or German minorities, in territories controlled by the Reich), or police duty. New members of the regular police force are recruited from the SS, so that eventually there will be no distinction between the two. (Himmler is both Chief of Police and Reichsführer of the SS.)

3. The Role of the NSKK.2/ The Motor Corps provides expert transportation and courier service to the armed forces and their auxiliary organizations. A special NSKK Motorboat Corps (Kraftbootzug) is trained to perform landing and water transport operations in conjunction with the Army

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1/ Ibid, pp. 191-197, 347-350, 430.

2/ Ibid, pp. 198-203.

and the Marines. They have their own training institutions (Motorsportschulen der NSKK) and organized pre-military and post-military motorized training in special groups (ages 18-45) called the Wehrstaffeln der Motorstürme.

4. The NSFK.1/ The Flying Corps is the organization charged with training the youth in "air-mindedness" and specific flying techniques, beginning with gliding. In 1938 the NSFK had some 250,000 members. In 1939 some 40,299 glider "tests" were given. The training groups are organized in the form of so-called Stürmen der NSFK and (since September 1939) spend their Sundays on the flying grounds, their evenings in the machine shops. The NSFK also carries on general propaganda for aviation through an organization called Förderer der NSFK, which works through such groups as the Hitler Youth Fliers (Flieger-HJ), aiming "to inoculate them with the flying spirit." They manage almost 300 different training schools and camps.

5. The Hitler Youth.2/ The HJ and BDM (League of German Girls) are trained in military and cooperative attitudes by example, precept and practice. Their auxiliary war work includes: spotting aircraft, office work in airports, painting runways, collecting useful junk and trash, delivering coal to invalids by express-cart, singing in hospitals for the wounded, soliciting for the Winter Help, tending children in day nurseries, aiding travellers in railway stations, helping to bring in the harvest (especially 1939), and putting on entertainment for the soldiers both over the radio and at the front. Beginning with September 1939 the 16-18 year-olds received a half-year of regular pre-military training. Both the NSKK and the NSFK sponsor driving and flying training programs in the Hitler Youth (Motorscharen der HJ, and Flieger-HJ). The Marine-HJ undertakes preliminary naval training. The following estimates have been made by an American observer long resident in Germany:

> "The HJ marines had an annual enrollment of 78,000.
>
> The HJ flyers had enough gliders and planes and teachers provided by the NS Flying Corps to teach 135,000 boys to fly each year.

1/ Ibid, pp. 207-209. See also "The Training of Youth in Aviation by Collaboration of the Hitler Youth and the NS Flying Corps," Deutsche Wehr, October 3, 1941, pp. 726-7; and two memoranda, "Pre-Military Aviation Training in Germany," November 10, 1941, and "The Process of Recruiting and Training the Flying Personnel of the German Air Force," November 1, 1941, from D. H. Brimhall, Director of Research, CAA, to R. H. Hinckley, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Air.

2/ Ibid, pp. 204-206.

The motorized units of the HJ enrolled 295,000 boys each year. The Party provided them with 5,000 motorcycles annually, and with 1,300 repair shops.

During an average twelve months the HJ conducted 3,540 official outdoor camps, attended by 565,000 boys.

In one year 6,000,000 German boys participated in sport events organized by the Hitler Youth Office.

The Party supplied the HJ with 10,000 revolvers a year, and with all the rifles they needed for rifle matches in which 30,000 of the Hitler Youth's best shots participated; the HJ had its own firearms school at Obermatzfeld, Thuringia, with Dr. Stellrecht as director."1/

6. Labor Service.2/ At the outbreak of war the great majority of Labor Service units were transferred to the Armed Forces to serve as Construction Companies (Baukompanien),3/ where their size was increased from 200 to 400 and even 600 men by calling back ex-trainees. Furthermore, on September 4, 1939, for the first time the Girls Labor Service was made obligatory and increased from around 30,000 to 100,000. On December 20, 1939, a law was passed indicating that normal Labor Service for men was to continue despite the special war work of the Construction Companies.

Both men and women in the Labor Service assist in agricultural work wherever there is a labor shortage, especially among the new German settlers in former Poland. The men in the Construction Companies work on fortifications, roads, bridges, river-ways, and airports; they facilitate transportation of food, ammunition and fuel during rapid military advances; they assist in the collection and sorting of war booty; they perform some police and sentry duty in newly occupied territories (Bicycle Corps).

7. The Labor Front. The Labor Front has a series of offices the purpose of which is to coordinate problems of production, labor-supply and social welfare as between industry

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1/ Ziemer, Education for Death, New York, 1941, pp. 155-6.

2/ Ibid, pp. 210-212.

3/ Hauptmann Klatt, "Flieger mit schwarzen Spiegeln," Sondernummer der Illustrirten Ztg., (Die Deutsche Luftwaffe), March 20, 1941, p. 276 for a description of Construction Companies in the Air Force.

and the armed forces: Wehrmachtsamt, Amt OKW, Amt Heer, Amt Kriegsmarine, and Amt Luftwaffe.

8. Strength through Joy. This organization also has a liaison office with the Armed Forces and the Labor Service, which presumably is concerned with recreation and entertainment for members of these two organizations.

9. Central Party Office for War Victims. This office has nine divisions, its own press, and a special cemetery. Affiliated with it is the National Socialist War Victims Welfare Association (NS.-Kriegsopferversorgung : NSKOV).

D. Extra-Military Organizations of the Party with Morale Functions

The Party organizations listed above contribute directly to army morale. Many other organizations, which include literally every German man, woman and child, supplement the work of these explicitly war-oriented units by aiming to strengthen nationalist sentiments or to build up feelings of social security. A few of these may be briefly noted:

(1) The Party Colonial Policy Office: propaganda agency for German colonies;

(2) Reich League for Physical Culture of the NS Party;

(3) Central Training Office of the NS Party (Hauptschulungsamt);

(4) The Castles of Order Office (Ordensburgen der NSDAP);

(5) Central office of the Factory Cell Organization (Hauptamt NSBO);

(6) Central Personnel Office of the Party (Hauptpersonalamt): facilitates army selection and placement problems;

(7) NS Public Welfare Association (NSV);

(8) NS Student League;

(9) NS Teachers' League;

(10) NS Women's Organization (NS. Frauenschaft);

(11) NS Nurses' Organization (NS. Schwesternschaft);

(12) League of German families.

This list is by no means exhaustive. In studying "procedures used to develop morale in the German armed forces" it is essential to remember that in National Socialist Germany the Armed Forces are only the most active sector of a military "front" which includes the whole nation. The Party organizational and propaganda program is and has been centered around the problem of "developing morale," and the morale of the Armed Forces emanates directly from the matrix of national morale.

> "In his parents' home, in school, in the Hitler Youth, in the subdivisions of the Movement, in the shop, in the Labor Service, the future Army recruit has been bred as a National Socialist; he does not know anything else but allegiance to the National Socialist State, and the life work of being a German."1/

The intimate dependence of military on civilian morale, and of both on the Party, is symbolized by the fact that in the 1941 Party Yearbook the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) are treated last on the list of "Party Organizations," being preceded by chapters on the SA, the SS, the Motor Corps, the Hitler Youth, the Flying Corps and the Labor Service. That the soldier himself is supposed to be aware of this intimate relationship between Party and Wehrmacht is indicated by the following commentary on the Oath of Loyalty in the Army Training Manual:

> "The Oath of Loyalty is rendered to the Führer and Chancellor, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This oath gives concrete expression to the symbolic personal bond between the Führer and /his/ soldiers. By means of this avowal of personal loyalty to the Führer the soldier at the same time pledges himself to the Third Reich and to the National Socialist Weltanschauung."2/

E. Role of the School System

Not to be overlooked among the formative agencies which contribute to the psychological and technical preparedness of the nation for war are the State, the Party, and the Military Training Schools. The Party Schools, under the control of the Hitler Youth Leadership and the SS, consist primarily of two types: the Adolf Hitler Schools and the so-called Napoli (National politische Erziehungsanstalten). Both are concerned with training Party leaders and thus contribute directly to the Nazi morale-building program. At the university

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1/ Oberleutnant Reischle, in Militaer-Wochenblatt, March 11, 1938, "Soldaten als Erzieher."

2/ Der Dienstunterricht im Heere, 1941, p. 29.

level selected graduates of these Party schools attend a five-year course at the Ordensburgen (Order Castles). The Military Training Schools (e.g. the Unteroffiziervorschulen and Unteroffizierschulen) are conducted in close conjunction with the local Hitler Youth and other Party organizations.

Not merely the Party and the Army Schools, however, but the State Schools themselves have been geared by the Nazis to play a vital role in the war effort. Their part in promoting interest in, and knowledge about aviation may serve as an example. In his decree of December 30, 1939, which presented a comprehensive program of adaptation of the school curriculum to this end, Minister Rust stated:

> "It is the task of the schools and universities to enable and inspire the youth for the preservation and further development of aviation, which is a vital necessity for the German nation, so that those elements will be available to aviation which it requires for the defence of the Reich and Germany's world prestige."

Summarizing this and an earlier decree of 1934, D. H. Brimhall, Director of Research of the CAA, writes:

> "Practically all pre-existing curricular topics are to be made subservient to the broad goal of instilling aviation enthusiasm into the hearts of the German youth. In the lower grades there is more of an emotional appeal (through instruction in history, German, etc.) progressing gradually in the middle and upper grades towards laying a solid foundation in aeronautical knowledge. This culminates in the upper grades in systematical model-building and a coherent succinct, if somewhat elementary course in aero-physics."1/

F. Role of the Nazi Penal Code

Even if all positive inducements may fail to bring national morale up to the desired level, the Gestapo and the regular police system function to prevent any subversive activity. Almost five years before the outbreak of war the new Penal Code established three offenses against "the spiritual fighting power of the nation" (disintegration of the national will to defend itself, participating in organizations opposed to national defense, and slandering the Armed Forces or their symbols), and two offenses against "the material fighting power of the nation" (agitating among troops or abetting desertion, and destruction or embezzlement of fighting equipment).2/

1/ Memorandum to Assistant Secretary Hinckley, August 26, 1941.

2/ U.S. M/A, Berlin, #14,043, April 25, 1935.

II. GENERAL MORALE PROVISIONS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES

A. Selection, Placement and Promotion of Personnel

There is no doubt that the Germans exercise great care in the selection of military personnel, and that many German psychologists, some officially employed in the Psychological Laboratory of the War Ministry, have thought and written extensively on this subject.1/ The role of the Central Personnel Office of the Party in facilitating selection of military manpower has already been noted.

The main problem however, is not to demonstrate German interest in the question or even to enumerate special tests devised to select personnel, but rather to establish the practical relevance of the formal psychological theories and tests to the actual selection, classification and promotion of men in the Armed Forces. The truth probably lies somewhere between the extreme views: (a) that the army authorities defer judgment entirely to the psychological experts in the Army Psychological Laboratory; and (b) that the army authorities wholly disregard the Laboratory findings.

Since the German Army psychologists themselves regard the formal tests as supplements to, rather than substitutes for, intuitive judgment of "the whole man," it may be presumed that judgment by qualified observers such as officers or special military umpires (in war games) will assume more and more importance in proportion as the soldier's field experience increases. A man who distinguishes himself in action needs no laboratory test to record his superior ability. We may therefore conclude that "testing" is deemed to be of more importance at the early stages of classification than at the later stage of promotion within the man's final specialty.

Furthermore, formal tests are generally agreed to be more appropriate in measuring special qualities and aptitudes--such as sensitivity to sound, or speed of eye-reaction--than in estimating a complex nexus of abilities such as must be possessed by a good military leader. The Germans too have

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1/ H. L. Ansbacher, "German Military Psychology," Psychol. Bull., 38, June, 1941, pp. 370-392; T. W. Harrell and R. W. Churchill, "Classification of Military Personnel," Ibid, pp. 331-353; H. L. Ansbacher and K. R. Nichols, "Selecting the Nazi Officer," The Infantry Journal, November 1941, pp. 45-48; L. Farago, Ed., German Psychological Warfare, New York, 1941, pp. 16-23.

found that as the test becomes more complex, so as to measure generalized aptitudes, it tends to approximate field conditions, which in themselves provide the best possible "testing laboratory." The criteria of judgment likewise become less objective and more subjective, and the best judge of the man's ability becomes the superior officer himself, with good psychological insight, rather than the professional psychologist with a limited background of military experience. The value of realistic manouvers as a testing ground for human material is largely lost, however, if the umpires themselves are not thoroughly versed in the skills and problems involved.1/

An example of the attention devoted to socio-psychological considerations in matters of placement is seen in the care used in grouping various types of men together in combat units. It has been found useful to distribute a few older veterans from World War I in among the new recruits: the youngsters are inspired by the good example of the "old warriors," while the oldsters are cheered by the freshness and enthusiasm of their young comrades. Age differences of 10-12 years are normal in fighting units, although a 20-year span sometimes exists. Company Commanders also aim to sort out their men in terms of native ability of various kinds, giving weight to these differences in the assignment of tasks; care must be exercised, however, to avoid branding some as "weaklings" or "favorites." Young recruits have unlimited energy, while 30-year-olds "seem to carry a little pack of worries about with them," since they experience greater difficulty in laying aside their responsibilities with regard to family, education and career. While handling these personnel matters is primarily the job of the Group Leader (Gruppenführer), he may be aided by the work of the Welfare Officer (Fürsorgeoffizier).2/

B. Officer-Men Relations

On duty the relationship of German officers to their men is based on a high state of discipline. There is no fraternization between the ranks while on duty, but the officers have a more human attitude toward the soldiers than in the past.

1/ Cf. "Combat Training," C. and G.S.S. Military Review, XXI, January 1942, pp. 84-86 (Militär-Wochenblatt, January 17, 1941). See further Frederic Sondern, "The Brain Power of Hitler's Army," Readers Digest, July 1941, pp. 7-12.

2/ "Zur Psychologie der Gruppe," Deutsche Wehr, September 19, 1941, p. 694.

If an officer has a relative or a friend who is an enlisted man, he now thinks nothing of eating with his friend in public; but this type of fraternization is strictly limited to off-duty intervals.1/ Informality of off-duty relationships between officers and men--even to the extent of attending the same brothels--has been reported by official American observers in both Athens and Bucharest.2/

The Training Manual devotes special attention to the problem of the relation between the newly promoted officer and his former comrades who are now his subordinates. Such an officer must learn how to be "both superior and comrade." His men must show him proper respect and faithfully execute his commands. The use of the informal conversational "Du" must stop.3/

German literature on the role of the officer stresses the importance of his being at all times a model of behavior to his men: ethically unimpeachable, always conscious of his responsibilities and ready to take a personal interest in each of his men. As the Training Manual states, "Military leadership is predicated upon cheerful responsibility, superior ability and untiring care." In short, the officer is to be an example to his superiors, to his men, to his men's families and all the rest of the civilian population of the best virtues of German "soldierdom." The injunction that the officer should aim to be a counsellor to his men when they encounter personal difficulties (bereavement, financial embarrassments, legal complexities, etc.) is thought to be of considerable importance in maintaining an atmosphere of mutual trust and freedom from worry.4/

1/ Abstract of remarks made by Major W. R. Wolfinberger, former Asst. U.S. M/A, Berlin, May 1940 to October 1941, to Board of Analysts, COI, November 28, 1941.

2/ U.S. M/A, Bucharest, #2561, March 10, '41; U.S. M/A, Athens, June 27, 1941; U.S. M/A, Ankara, #7257 and #7258, July 31, 1941.

3/ Dienstunterricht, p. 45.

4/ An excellent summary of the officer ideal is available in "The Company Commander," Military Review, XXI, October 1941, pp. 5-12 (condensed from a German book with the same title by Hans Ellenbeck). Cf. also Max Simoneit, "Die Idee des Soldatentums," in Deutsche Soldaten, edited by Hans Roden, Berlin, 1935, pp. 239-242; G. Thomee, "Die Wehrmacht des III. Reiches," in Die Deutschen Soldatenkunde, Vol. I, Leipzig, 1937, pp. 206-209; and "German Military Leadership," a 47-page report from U.S. M/A Berlin, #17,717, November 18, 1940, (a compendium of German writings).

Several organizational and regulative innovations have been made by the new German Army which probably contribute to maintenance of good officer-men relationships.

(1) The exclusion of Jews from military service has removed one minor factor which had occasionally contributed to inter-personal strain in the old army, since in many cases Jews were excluded from officer-rank by social prejudice.

(2) The loosening up of social caste distinctions in general has undoubtedly promoted good morale. Since all soldiers, officers and men alike, pass through the same training (including common experience in Party formations like the Labor Service), regardless of social origin or Party position, a soldier can no longer have the unpleasant experience of finding himself under an "officer" who has slipped into his position because of his higher social standing and with one year's less actual training. There is no formal educational requirement for officer training beyond the age of 18.1/ Rank distinctions expressed in food, clothing, tobacco, alcohol and other rations or privileges (including pay and leave) have been greatly reduced, as contrasted with the last war.

(3) Most important of all is the new requirement which democratizes the salute. This is now a required greeting, not only between inferiors and superiors, but between equals as well. This salute is referred to in the Training Manual as the "mutual comradely greeting."2/

C. Social Controls--Rules of Conduct, Rewards and Punishment

At the heart of the German soldier's code lie the Oath to the Colors and the eight "Duties." The Oath reads as follows:

"I swear by God this holy oath: that I will unconditionally obey the Fuehrer of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Commander-in-Chief of

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1/ N. Holm, Ich werde Soldat!, Hamburg, 1936; Jahrbuch des deutschen Heeres, 1941, pp. 134-140 and 148-153.

2/ Der Dienstunterricht im Heere, 1941, p. 95.

the Armed Forces, and that I will be ready at anytime as a brave soldier, to pledge my life for this oath."

On this Oath the Training Manual comments:

"The Oath to the Colors binds the soldier for his whole life. It excludes any reservation. In doing this the soldier promises: 'To you, my Fuehrer, I will stand in unconditional obedience, faithful and courageous, will not leave you in the hour of battle or disaster or emergency or danger, so help me God. And if I meet death, then I will die the finest death which a man can be granted; the death of honor, death for one's people and Fatherland. Many hundreds of thousands before me have sealed their soldier's oath with their blood, faithful to their pledge, their duty and their honor! I will emulate them and show myself in life and in death worthy of their heritage.'"1/

The Manual goes on to explain that all the trappings of the soldier's profession--his banners, his medals, his weapons, even his uniform--symbolize the fact of his sacred bond of unity with the fate of his people. The gist of the soldier's creed is summed up in the ceremonial formulation of his eight "Duties" (Die Pflichten des deutschen Soldaten), which every soldier is supposed to memorize:

"(1) The Armed Forces are the guardians of the German people. They protect the German Reich and Fatherland, and the German people and their living-space united under National Socialism. The roots of their strength lie in a famous past, in German popular tradition, in the German soil and in German labor. Service in the Armed Forces is honorary service to the German people.

(2) The honor of the soldier consists of an unconditional pledging of his person for his people and his Fatherland, including the sacrifice of his own life.

(3) The highest soldierly virtue is a militant spirit. It demands toughness and determination. Cowardice is contemptible, hesitation unsoldierly.

(4) Obedience is the foundation of the army, confidence the foundation of obedience. Soldierlike leadership rests on a joyful assumption of responsibility, superior competence and tireless attentiveness.

1/ P. 29.

(5) Great achievements in war and peace arise only from unshakable combat team-work between leaders and troops.

(6) Combat team-work requires comradeship, which proves its worth especially in times of emergency and danger.

(7) Self-conscious but nevertheless modest, upright and loyal, honest and trustworthy, reticent and scrupulous, the soldier should be an example of manly strength for his whole people. Only achievements justify pride.

(8) The soldier finds his greatest reward and his highest happiness in the consciousness of faithfully fulfilled duty. Character and achievement are the hallmarks of a good soldier".1/

The importance of these formulae of soldierly virtue is further indicated by the 13 pages of exegesis (with copious examples) devoted to them in the Training Manual, and by the fact that a writer in the Militär-Wochenblatt of August 15, 1941, felt called upon to complain that too little attention was being paid to instruction in the "Duties" in the 8-week refresher courses for reservists.2/

Further description of actual regulations would involve a reproduction of a large part of the Training Manual.3/ The existence of an attractive, competent handbook of this sort can in itself be a potent factor for the maintenance of discipline and morale.

1. Penalties. Non-fulfillment of duty, if of minor importance, is punished by disciplinary measures. Major offenses are punished by court martial and loss of right to serve in the Armed Forces. The offenses which are punished by disciplinary punishments are:

(1) Failure to get up immediately after waking;

1/ Dienstunterricht, pp. 31-32.

2/ Military Review, XXI, January 1942, pp. 108-109.

3/ It has 332 pages and many illustrations (over 500, according to a note on the cover). There are 18 different editions for various branches of the Army, besides special versions for the Air Force and (?) the Navy. The edition used in the text, that for Army Rifle-Companies, first appeared in 1929 and was in its 12th revision by 1941.

(2) Tardiness in reporting for duty;

(3) Untidy or inappropriate uniform;

(4) Neglect of one's articles of clothing or appearance;

(5) Neglect of one's duties as room chairman (Stubenältester);

(6) Cupboard not locked, as commanded;

(7) Unauthorized hoarding of money and other valuables;

(8) Offenses against comradely conduct;

(9) Staying out without leave beyond taps;

(10) Improper behavior toward superiors, comrades, or in public;

(11) Contracting debts, playing games of chance for money, drunkenness, deceitfulness toward a superior;

(12) Negligence and impermissable talking while on duty;

(13) Non-execution of a received command.

The following are the usual punishments for breaches of discipline:

(1) Smaller Punishments--

(a) Reproof;

(b) Special obligations outside of the usual routine (for example, special exercises, special duty on watch, special service in the barracks or in the stables, etc.);

(c) Withholding of pay up to two months in case of unmarried men;

(d) Limitations on leave up to four weeks.

(2) Severe Punishments--

(a) Restriction of movement within the barracks or one's quarters up to four weeks;

(b) Mild arrest;

(c) More severe arrest;

(d) Severe arrest up to ten days.

Additional punishments in the form of demotion, confiscation of pay or restrictions on leave may also be given as supplements to the above.

The following are the actions for which court martial punishments are given:

(1) Cowardice;

(2) Desertion;

(3) Abuse of power;

(4) Unauthorized departure or extension of leave beyond seven days;

(5) Serious cases of disobedience;

(6) Theft, particularly from one's comrades;

(7) Betrayal of military secrets.

"Disciplinary punishments can be carried out only on the next day, and after the accused has had an opportunity to contest the charge."1/

An interesting feature of German army disciplinary procedure is that the soldier is always punished in private, since it is felt that public humiliation of a soldier, whether before his comrades or before civilians, is likely to undermine respect for the military establishment in general. It will be recalled that Party procedure with respect to the Jews is exactly opposite.

2. Complaints. The Training Manual goes into great detail in the matter of complaints. A right to complain clearly exists, but its use is a matter requiring a great sense of tact on the part of both plaintiff and judge. "It is advisable," states the Manual, "to secure the counsel of an older comrade before entering a complaint, and to consider whether or not the alleged injury was intentional."

Complaints may be entered (written or oral) not before the day after the supposed injustice and within seven days. Complaints by privates and NCO's are to be made to their immediate superiors, or, in case the immediate superior is himself the object of the complaint, to the next superior. The decision is rendered by said superior. If the complaint turns out to be without foundation there is no penalty, provided the plaintiff

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1/ Dienstunterricht, pp. 54-55.

has acted with good intentions and in accordance with the rules.

Group complaints and petitions are forbidden. If several individuals have a common complaint they must make it individually.1/

Captain Ellenbeck of the German Army has some wise comments to make on this subject. While complaints are to be regarded as exceptional, he states, and to be made only about matters of importance, it would be a great mistake for any Company Commander to let the impression become established that complaint should never be made. Despite possible unpleasantnesses, both for the soldier who enters the complaint and for his superior who must listen to it, failure to ask for redress, arising from a fake sentiment of decorum, can lead only to deterioration of organizational efficiency.2/

3. Rewards. Faithful and outstanding performance of duty is rewarded by promotion, medals or special privileges such as extra leave or assignment to cherished responsibilities. The Training Manual aims to create the impression that promotion, especially in the Army of the Third Reich, is the reward of merit. Cases of officers who rose from the ranks even in the old army are cited by way of proof.3/ Injuries incurred in the course of service which reduce earning power entitle a soldier to care at the expense of the State.

Many medals and orders are granted for distinguished service, and announcements of these awards, as well as of promotions, are featured in the daily press. News of awards quickly spreads through the hero's home community which, together with his family, shares in the reflected glory. The soldier is, however, urged to remember that his greatest reward is the respect and confidence of his superiors and the consciousness of having done his duty. An effort is made to avoid injustices in the awarding of medals--such as arose in the World War over the giving of the same "Iron Cross" medal to front line fighters and to deserving military desk workers behind the lines.4/

4. Military Police and Other Control Mechanisms. These are of two sorts: a Secret Military Police (Geheime Feldpolizei)

1/ Pp. 45, 109, 110.

2/ Military Review, October 1941, pp. 5-12.

3/ Der Dienstunterricht, p. 45.

4/ F. Altrichter, Die seelischen Kräfte des deutschen Heeres, p. 218.

identifiable by a special uniform, and "really" secret spies or agents planted by Himmler.1/ It is to be presumed that the many prominent representatives of militant Nazi organizations serving in the Wehrmacht--such as Hitler-Youth Leaders, or the 80% of all SA. Leaders, to say nothing of the Waffen-SS--would all be willing to lend their services in the cause of anti-anti-Nazi espionage.

Furthermore, every soldier is directed to be his own spy--if need be, on his comrades. "It is the duty of a soldier to report immediately every suspicion he may have regarding possible espionage or sabotage. Rather one case too many than one too few! Silence would be false comradeship: a traitor is no comrade!"2/

In minor matters of every day routine as well, the soldier is enjoined to keep a "comradely" watch over the doings of his fellows. At times this "watchfulness" would seem to go to extremes. For example, soldiers are warned not to drink cold water after a hot march.

> "In a heated condition it is absolutely forbidden to drink more than one glass of luke-warm water slowly in small sips, however much one may be tortured by thirst. It is the comradely duty of every soldier and the task of the room-chairman to watch out in such cases and to take the necessary precautionary measures (if need be by emptying the water pitchers, etc.).3/

A similar injunction applies in cases of too much drinking.

> "Excessive use of alcohol is altogether avoided by a good soldier (a soldierly duty!), and still

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1/ U.S. M/A, Berlin, #18,723, October 20, 1941, quoting Heeresverordnungsblatt, September 11, 1941; U.S. M/A, Berlin, #18,654, September 22, 1941, quoting Marineverordnungsblatt, September 15, 1941; G. A. Minto, "Notes on Police and Similar Formations in the Reich," Journal of the Royal Artillery, October 1941, pp. 361-366.

2/ Dienstunterricht, p. 54.

3/ Dienstunterricht, p. 66. Italics in original. The 1936 edition of the Machine Gunners' Training Manual is even more categorical on this point: "Any water-pitchers available must be emptied immediately, in order to deprive the weak-of-will of any further opportunity to drink." (p. 83.)

more he guards against having dealings with women when under the influence of alcohol. It is comradely duty to keep others from committing such stupidities."1/

D. Training, Equipment and Special Services

A German military writer has distinguished three aspects of army training: the trained soldier must handle the weapons of war with skill, he must be able to fight with combative or aggressive spirit, and he must have deep within him an unfaltering loyalty to his country. It is the aim of military training to teach the soldier these three qualities: technical military skills, fighting spirit, and unwavering love of country.2/

Attention has already been called to the detail and attractiveness of the soldier's Training Manual, and to the variety of agencies, both Party and State, which contribute to his military orientation and conditioning and even, it may be, to his military proficiency, before he is actually inducted into the Armed Forces.

All accounts agree in ascribing a high degree of efficiency to the training, equipment and special services with which the German soldier is provided. In the strained German economy it is literally true that the soldier gets "the best of everything"--the best food for his diet, the best leather for his shoes, the best metal for his gun, and the best brains to shape his destiny that German military leadership can provide. There is no doubt that at least the myth of faultless preparation greatly contributes to the soldier's selfconfidence. As one man exclaimed when marching through Libya and seeing everywhere the hand of German science--telephone lines, signposts, piles of stores, field kitchens, mobile machine shops, etc.--"It gives the soldier a comforting and secure feeling to go into battle under such well-prepared conditions."3/

1/ Ibid, p. 67.

2/ Oberleutnant Reischle, "Soldaten als Erzieher," Militär-Wochenblatt, March 11, 1938, pp. 2358-2360.

3/ "Tanks in a Sand Storm," Military Review, XXI, October 1941, p. 64. Digested from an article by W. Reuter, German war correspondent, in the Lokal-Anzeiger, April 9, 1941. Cf. also "The Equipment of German Parachutists," Military Review, XXI, March 1941, p. 47 (from Krasnaya Zvyesda, August 15, 1940).

A recent first-hand account of German soldiers in Libya describes their clothing, their personal equipment, their compact food, their splendidly equipped medical units, their field repair shops for machines; their various types of guns, their transport vehicles, their special re-usable metal containers for gasoline, benzine, paraffin, water, Diesel oil, lubricating oil; their training in knowledge of and respect for their enemy; their special tank carriers which bring tanks up to field of combat and remove the damaged ones (both theirs and the enemy's) by night; and their comfortable rest camps by the seaside. On his own person each man carries an amazing variety of gadgets and materials:

> "A green bivouac tent complete with floor and extra roof covering . . . neat little camp stoves that burn solid methylated spirit, eye lotion, mouth-wash, body powder, washing sets, flash-light, vacuum flasks, note-books, and sets of brightly colored bakelite boxes in which they keep odds and ends."1/

The question of food may serve as an example of detailed preparation and efficient execution. Several years before the outbreak of war a commission of dietary experts was appointed to investigate the nutritional value of army fare. Their findings were reported in a 333-page volume published in 1939, entitled "Army Nutrition and Provisioning," which discusses the problem from numerous points of view. One of their findings was that canteen consumption varied inversely with the quality of regular fare provided, so that no net saving of foodstuffs resulted from economy in regular diet.2/

Some of the results of this careful planning can be seen in the new forms of nourishment with which the soldiers are provided, which are light in weight, compact in size, high in nutritive value and easy to prepare.3/

1. Training. The elaborate provisions for pre-military training have already been discussed. In addition to two years' formal military training and eight weeks annual refresher

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1/ Alan Moorehead, "The Nazi Soldier as I Have Seen Him," Life, February 9, 1942, pp. 15-19.

2/ W. Kittel, W. Schreiber and W. Ziegelmayer, Soldatenernährung und Gemeinschaftsverpflegung, Dresden and Leipzig, 1939.

3/ W. A. Pashley, "Notes on the Ration Supply of the German Army," Military Review, XXI, January 1942, pp. 10-12. Cf. also "The Food of the German Soldier," Military Review, XXI, January 1942, p. 73 (Militär-Wochenblatt, May 30, 1941).

training for the reservists all army officers are given continuation training while on active duty. It is regarded as one of the most essential duties of a commanding officer in wartime to ensure the continued training of his junior officers, who must be made to realize that "to stand still is to retrogress." They must constantly check up on their mastery of military fundamentals: definition of military terms, solution of tactical problems, skill in handling men, administration, battle leadership, reconnaissance, intelligence work, squad work, etc. This officer training is of special importance because of the rapid expansion of personnel since 1933 and the rapid development of the war since September 1939. These factors "have compelled the use of short-cuts in the training of the officer corps . . . Many gaps exist in the theoretical and practical training of our officers, especially in the training of the young officers called to duty as a result of the war." Inadequate training may result in "mistakes with effects which God and time cannot erase."1/

A possible confirmation of the existence of gaps in the theoretically perfect German training program is found in a Russian source which states that the average training period of German prisoners captured last summer was 6-9 months.2/

Great emphasis is placed on versatility of competence. The Training Manual for riflemen, for example, has considerable information on machine guns, mine-throwers, care of horses and other matters with which the rifle specialist would ordinarily have little or nothing to do. Similarly men and officers are trained to be able to replace their comrades in different executive roles in case of need, thus providing added strength to the Einheit principle of organization.3/ Most spectacular of all efforts in this direction is General Halder's program, begun early in 1938, of developing so-called "three-dimensional specialists." These were a few dozen selected army officers who were given thorough training in the navy and air-force. Later, in actual campaigns, these were the generals who displayed the most striking mastery of the problems of coordinating the various services.4/

1/ "Progressive Training of Officers," Military Review, XXI, October 1941, pp. 41-43, (Militär-Wochenblatt, April 25, May 2 and 9, 1941).

2/ E. Zvavich, "The Human Resources of Germany," Izvestia, August 7, 1941.

3/ See Handbook on German Military Forces (TM 30-450), pp. 2,3.

4/ F. Sondern, "The Brain Power of Hitler's Army," Readers Digest, July 1941, pp. 7-12.

One interesting departure of present-day German training practice from those of the old army is the deliberate avoidance of punitive drill. The use of Schleifen (crawling till exhausted) as a disciplinary measure, or of Schikanieren (plaguing subordinates by means of needlessly difficult assignments, perhaps merely to satisfy the officer's will to dominate) are alike condemned.1/

2. Preparation for Unknown Weapons, Sounds and Other Unusual Conditions. There is no better preventive against fear and panic than thorough preparation for encountering new or unusual situations. Veteran German front-line fighters in the last war used to study captured enemy weapons in order to be able to use them in an emergency--which they sometimes did with great effectiveness.2/ Similar training is also given in the present German army.3/

Specialist training for unique combat situations has been given some dramatic demonstrations in recent German campaigns. To mention only one example, the "mysterious" attack on Fort Eben Emael in May 1940 loses a little of its mystery when one realizes that radio communication was maintained between ground forces and parachutists up to the moment of their landing on the fortifications from the air.4/

The equipment of German parachute troops in Crete has been fully described in a British information bulletin prepared for troops.5/

Perhaps the most striking example of painstaking preparation for combat conditions is the development of the pre-military training for the German Air Force.6/

3. Medical Services. The organization of medical services in the German Army is described in the U.S. Army TM 30-450,

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1/ Deutsche Wehr, 1941, pp. 402,403.

2/ Cf. the combat descriptions in Hans Zöberlein's war diary, Der Glaube an Deutschland, Munich, 1931.

3/ Cf. "German Pioneers in English Tanks," Military Review, April 1942, p. 72.

4/ "German Signal Forces," Military Review, XXI, March 1941, p. 57.

5/ War. News-Facts for Fighting Men, #6, November 29, 1941, pp. 5,6.

6/ Deutsche Wehr, October 3, 1941, pp. 726, 727, and memoranda prepared by the CAA, referred to above, p. 8.

Handbook on German Military Forces, pp. 279-284. A German account of "The Organization of the Medical Service of the German Army and Its Employment in This Campaign against Poland" concludes:

> "It was proven in Poland that the medical service of the German Army in Poland was elastic enough, under the highly capable direction of the medical officers in charge, to measure up to all requirements. We are happy to state that the medical service at no time faced a problem it could not solve."1/

Deutsche Wehr of November 21, 1941, publishes two very interesting autobiographical accounts by field orderlies in Russia describing their difficulties in finding the wounded and transporting them at night by primitive horsecart (Panjefahrzeug) through woods and over country roads deep in mire--all within range of enemy patrols.2/

Quite a contrast is provided by an account in the same publication three weeks earlier, which describes the smooth functioning of hospital air-transport. First tried out in the Gran Chaco, then in the Spanish Civil War, the 3-motored Junkers-52 converted into a hospital transport--the so-called Sanitäts-Ju--has three great advantages over any known land vehicle for the removal of wounded. It is much speedier and can take the wounded directly to a homeland hospital; it is vastly more comfortable, especially where roads are poor; and it can easily traverse territory impassible on the ground. The cabin is rigged up with many of the gadgets of a modern hospital room. It can accommodate 8-10 badly wounded on stretchers, or 22 lightly wounded.3/

The use of a quick anodyne has been reported. It is in the form of an antiseptic-soaked bandage kept in an inside pocket in the lining of the lower left corner of the soldier's tunic, and is to be used on wounds to reduce dangers of infection.4/

Certain drugs appear to be used as battle stimulants, principally amphetamine sulfate and the very similar pervitin. According to an American scientist, Dr. Gordon A. Alles,

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1/ Twelve page translation of a Manuscript by Dr. H. Hartleben (no source given), in Army War College Library: U.15.A.36. #229, where reference is made to Wachsmuth, Der Deutsche MilitarArzt, 1939.

2/ Pp. 837, 838.

3/ Deutsche Wehr, October 31, 1941, pp. 790, 791.

4/ Military Review, June 1941, pp. 52,53.

California Institute of Technology, the effect of these drugs is similar to that of caffeine but acts more in the mental sphere.1/

The rather mysterious "bottle collection" for the army which took place all over Germany last autumn was justified in the Frankfurter Zeitung of November 8 as aiming to provide spirit containers for the troops. Spirits were to be taken only "after fighting," but were also said to be a regular part of the army winter diet.

The adequacy of medical services during the past six months is put in a somewhat questionable light by reports and rumors of inadequate clothing and medical supplies on the Eastern the Eastern Front, especially as reported by a Swiss Medical Mission in mid-winter.2/ An article in the Danziger Vorposten of Feb. 17, 1942, attributes the slowness of Axis progress on the Murmansk front to difficulties of communications which "often" imposed delays of 12-16 hours in transporting the wounded to casualty stations.3/ A German aviator in Libya, holder of the Iron Cross, wrote his family that he had to have a filling reset by a "filthy" native practitioner.4/ While these and other similar reports are only isolated cases they indicate that the German army medical services may not be quite so "perfect" as official spokesmen claim.5/

E. Provision for Relaxation and Recreation.

The following recreational facilities are utilized in the theaters of operations:

(1) Every organization is provided with radio receiving sets and an extension loud speaker system. Frequent talks by officers and men on combat experiences are offered. Every Sunday a long request program is broadcast with music and witty stories of soldier life.

(2) The best opera, theatrical, and musical talent make frequent visits to the troops.

1/ Washington Post, October 19, 1941.

2/ COI Accessions #13857.

3/ News-Digest, No. 768, March 14, 1942, B-I. (COI Accessions #P-32).

4/ Manuscript #307, German Life History Archive, Widener Library.

5/ Cf. U.S. M/A, Berlin, #18,723, October 20, 1941; U.S. Minister, Helsinki, #53 (cable), January 20, 1942.

(3) Every organization sees the weekly newsreel as well as current propaganda films, educational pictures and romances in which the male is shown in heroic role. No pictures are shown which create doubt or homesickness.

(4) Troops are furnished daily papers giving world news.

(5) Conducted tours are made to points of interest.

(6) Every organization develops musical or theatrical clubs.

(7) Games such as handball, swimming, horseback riding are encouraged.1/

1. Physical Training--Sports. The purpose of recreation is to build up a sense of physical and mental superiority. It is considered as part of basic character training rather than a matter of pleasure and for this reason regarded as more important in training areas than in the theater of operations.

Since every soldier must be regarded as superior, interorganizational competition is not permitted. Sports become, therefore, a matter of physical culture primarily.2/

2. Individual Interests.

(1) Soldiers allowed considerable latitude in taking pictures. Nearly all have cameras and pictures are developed by the Propaganda Company or by civilian organizations.

(2) Mail censorship is as liberal as possible.

(3) Soldiers who are artistically or musically inclined are allowed to bring kits into theater of operations.

(4) Encouragement is given to recounting personal experience to assemblies of men within same organizations. The best of these are broadcast.3/

1/ Military Attache, Berlin, Report #18,290, May 19, 1941.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Ibid.

Theatrical entertainment is provided by the activities of the Hitler Youth, the Strength through Joy Organization and especially by the Propaganda Companies, who arrange for troop entertainment as well as providing the home front with news of army life.

Reading matter is provided by means of the "Troop Libraries," which are of two sorts: one for officers and one for men. The Officers' Libraries contain mostly scientific and professional books; while the Soldier Libraries (Mannschaftsbücherein) "are intended primarily for entertainment and diversion in leisure time, but also for self-education." These provisions apply to the Air Force, but the Army and the Navy have their own stocks of books.1/

At the War Book Week Celebration at Weimar, October 27, 1941, Goebbels announced that 3 million of "the best German books" had been specially reprinted for army distribution. Furthermore, the Party organized an ambitious book collection program in the course of which 7000 Party collectors managed to collect 6,700,000 books, from private sources, which were sent for distribution to 60,000 army libraries. The books at the front are intended, states Goebbels, not simply to pass the time, but to remind the soldier of his ties with the homeland and its superior culture.2/

Germans have donated more than 2,250,000 phonograph records and 47,568 phonographs for soldiers on the Russian front, according to Goebbels.3/ In addition to listening to music it is probable that group singing, a prominent feature of German army life, provides considerable release of tension both in camp and on the march.

Soldiers are reported to have plentiful supplies of liquor and cigarettes, according to an Army Propaganda Company dispatch.4/ Cigarette rations are said to be increased when

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1/ Westarpscher Taschenkalender für die Luftwaffe, 1940-41, pp. 1242, 1243; photograph, "Books for Every Taste," Brüsseler Ztg., March 1, 1941; photograph, "The German Army Library (Heeresbücherei) Provides our Soldiers with Reading Matter," Jahrbuch der Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, 1941, p. 185.

2/ Deutsche Allgemeine Ztg., October 27, 1941.

3/ New York Times, January 1, 1942.

4/ Chicago Daily News, October 23, 1941.

troops are in stationary positions behind the lines.1/

3. Furloughs. Frequent furloughs are given. Married men are encouraged to take a two-week furlough four times a year. Unmarried men get half as much furloughs.2/ To facilitate readjustment to combat conditions members of the Air Force are required to spend the second half of their leaves at specified recreation centers.3/ The Training Manual makes it clear that leave is a privilege rather than a right of the soldier, but semi-official commentaries argue its importance for sound work.4/ Wherever the front is remote leave may have to be omitted entirely. German troops in Finland were promised leave after Norway but most of them have not been home for more than a year and a half.5/

4. Plunder. While not officially sanctioned, the practice of plunder, often ill-concealed by various pseudo-legal devices, has been reliably reported from almost all the occupied territories. Looting for private gain--not confiscation for military use, which is justified--undoubtedly provides a novel form of recreation for German soldiers, with an added touch of excitement because it is against orders.6/

5. Pay. The basic pay for a private is half a mark a day (about 20 cents). Officer pay is reckoned at about two-thirds that of the U.S. Army.7/ Provision for the soldier's wife and family is so ample, according to recent German newspapers, that married women whose husbands are in the fighting services have insufficient motivation to do war work.8/

1/ Mr. Landreth Harrison, State Department, interviewed January 27, 1942.

2/ Military Attache, Berlin Report #18,290, May 19, 1941.

3/ Military Attache, Berlin, Report #18,290, May 19, 1941.

4/ Deutsche Wehr, April 25, 1941, p. 276.

5/ Military Attache, Helsinki, Report #445, October 22, 1941.

6/ Der Dienstunterricht, p. 49; Deutsche Wehr, May 23, 1941, p. 382.

7/ Holm, Ich werde Soldat!, p. 81; details in Handbook on German Military Forces (TM 30-450).

8/ Svenska Dagbladet, March 21, 1942 (News-Digest, #775, March 23, 1942, B-VI).

6. Sex. The Training Manual preaches a Puritanical doctrine with respect to sex. The soldier is specifically warned against contact with commercial prostitutes, who in this respect are put in the same category as Jews.1/

The prime consideration is the maintenance of his health, which is the soldier's patriotic duty. Considerable space is devoted to the dangers of venereal disease and to the insidious effects of alcohol in this connection. The symptoms are described in detail, however, and explicit directions given for treatment.2/ Unmarried soldiers on furlough are provided with protective devices.3/

A further justification for keeping away from unknown women is found in the rules covering protection against foreign espionage.4/

Little information is available on organized prostitution for the benefit of the German soldier, but the following remarks by the U.S. Military Attache in Berlin are of some interest:

> "In certain cases houses of prostitution are provided under direct control of the military (notably in Poland). The general plan followed is to provide girls who are young, attractive and volunteers. One of these houses has been described as follows: The lower floor is the quarters for the guard; the second floor is a soldier's canteen and reading room; the third floor is fixed up for the girls who are encouraged to provide an attractive homelike atmosphere. They are on duty between 4 P.M. and 10 P.M. and keep all of their fee of 5 Reichmarks for half an hour's entertainment.
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> "Before a soldier goes to the third floor he is given a medical examination. He must not be under the influence of liquor in any degree nor are the girls permitted to drink or to have liquor in their rooms.

1/ Dienstunterricht, p. 35.

2/ Ibid, p. 67.

3/ U.S. M/A, Berlin, #18,290, May 19, 1941.

4/ Dienstunterricht, p. 53.

"The girl initials the soldier's service record, and the guard makes an appropriate entry for control purposes."1/

Jocular references to the Women's Auxiliary as the Lustwaffe (pun on Luftwaffe, Air Force; literally, "Joy Force"), as well as recurrent reports in the press, suggest that one of the "incidental" functions of the HvD (Helferinnen vom Dienst), who handle clerical work behind the lines, is to facilitate the soldier's sexual adjustment.2/ Homosexuality is discussed in an army psychological journal as a phenomenon related in most cases to loneliness on the part of the new recruit.3/

F. Maintenance of Ties with Home and Civilian Life

According to the National Socialist Yearbook, 1941, one of the main contributions of the Party to the war effort is provision for the social welfare of the soldier's kin while he is in the service. Food-supply, income, health, education, housing, etc. are all supposedly taken care of by special Party offices, among which the NSV (NS Public Welfare Organization) is probably most important. German children will not be neglected in this war, the Nazis firmly declare.4/

"The soldier in the Army, the Navy or the Air Force knows that his family is being provided for; he need have no worries about 'things at home.' Because of this knowledge his fighting strength and powers of resistence are inexhaustible."5/

Mail, including packages, for the front-soldier are practically guaranteed by the efforts of the Party Local Office (Ortsgruppe) covering the soldier's home.6/ Old newspapers and magazines are collected by the Blockleiter and sent to the front.7/ Non-combatants, on the other hand, are guaranteed frequent accounts of life at the front by the activities of the

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1/ U.S. M/A, Berlin, #18,290, May 19, 1941.

2/ Cf. Gottfried Lesko, I Was a Nazi Flyer, N.Y., 1941.

3/ Grunwaldt, H. "Das erotische Moment im Rekrutenleben," Soldatentum, 1937, pp. 31-36.

4/ Jahrbuch der Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, 1941, p. 72.

5/ Op. cit., p. 181.

6/ Op. cit., loc. cit.

7/ National-Zeitung, February 24, 1942 (News-Digest, #761, B-IV).

unique Propaganda Companies (PK). These units, which appear to be a part of each Field Army, under the control of Section Ic (Intelligence) of the General Staff, include about 150 men each and a disproportionately large number of officers. These have equal military status with other soldiers, share all combat perils, but devote all their energies to recording events at the front in word and picture. German newspapers and popular magazines are full of articles and photographs supplied by the PK.1/ German shop-windows are filled with books glorifying the victories of 1939-41. According to a statement by Goebbels, more than a hundred prominent German writers are serving in these Propaganda Companies at the Front.2/ The propaganda effect of the weekly Front Newsreels, both at home and abroad, is considerable.3/

The problem of professional education while in the army is difficult to solve during campaigns. During quiet periods as much as possible is done to permit soldiers to attend neighboring universities (e.g. Freiburg, from the West Wall, in the winter 1939-40), or to read on technical subjects in their leisure time. That the problem is finding some solution is suggested by the fact that, according to one official observer, more than half of all medical students are in the Armed Forces, where their training is said to continue in field hospital units.

The virtual maintenance of the normal German birth rate--at least up until August 1941, the last month for which data are available--serves to keep alive the soldier's family sentiments and provides one further tie with civilian life. Married men are given special concessions regarding leave whenever feasible. The contrast of present demographic trends with those in the World War, when the birth-rate fell by almost a half within two years after the outbreak of hostilities, is in part attributable to the intermittent character of the fighting in World War II; it is also no doubt due to deliberate Party demographic policies, motivated at least in part by a desire to maintain as great a degree of normalcy as possible in civilian-

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1/ Special Memorandum, "German Morale Organization," Central Information Section, MID, February 4, 1941, referring to an article by Lt. Col. Volkmann in the Völkischer Beobachter, December 6, 1940. Cf. "Kriegsberichte einst und jetzt," Deutsche Wehr, October 24, 1941, pp. 773-774.

2/ Deutsche Allgemeine Ztg., Oct. 27, 1941.

3/ Cf. COI Report No. 20, "Designs of Propaganda in German Foreign Newsreels," and Jahrbuch der Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, 1941, pp. 31-32.

army relations during wartime.1/

One of the pleasanter features of German army life is the opportunity for "recuperation leave" at Europe's most prized resorts, many of which are now under Nazi control, from Norwegian fjords to the Aegean, from the Tatra to the Pyrenees. Submarine crews are given long furloughs at mountain resorts where they enjoy skiing and other winter sports.2/ In this, as in many other respects, army life provides for the German soldier experiences and opportunities for which he gladly abandons his relatively unglamorous civilian role.3/

Another device to build up close ties between home and front is the Party's promotion of collection campaigns--bottles, warm clothes, Christmas candles, funds to build soldier rest-homes in Norway--anything to show the men in the fighting forces that the "folks back home" really care and are making sacrifices in their own way for the common cause.4/

Unity of sentiment between Army and Party is expressed, formally at any rate, by the mutual exchange of the Hitler Salute between members of the two organizations, since, as the Army Training Manual explains, "Both serve the same Führer."5/ The wife of a German officer on duty in Norway reported, however, that German soldiers do not eat at the same restaurants as the Waffen-SS and do not even salute them.6/

Mail delivery to soldiers is complicated by Blitzkrieg tactics, and, despite every effort, there are occasional hitches in the program.

1/ Cf. COI Report No. 21, "Current German Attitudes and the German War Effort," pp. 33, 34. The monthly trends in German vital statistics are given in the bi-monthly Wirtschaft und Statistik.

2/ See the frequent illustrations in popular magazines such as Signal, Berliner Illustrierte Ztg., Die Woche, etc.

3/ Cf. Hans Habe, "The Smiling Nazi Soldier," Free World, December 1941, pp. 263-267.

4/ Cf. George Axelson on the significance of the warm clothing collection, New York Times, January 23, 1941; and Goebbels' Christmas Eve broadcast, Ibid, December 25, 1941.

5/ Dienstunterricht, p. 35.

6/ U.S. M/A, Berlin, #18,576, August 18, 1941.

According to Leske's "diary," one of the most effective devices for overcoming the soldier's loneliness is the Grete Schmidt program over the German home radio and the cult which has grown up around it. She speaks in a weekly program called "Greetings from Back Home." Her voice is said to be so glamorous, and her manner so alluring, that, according to Leske, she has a soldier fan mail of over a hundred thousand letters a week. She answers every letter but sends a sentimental poem instead of her photograph, preferring to remain the soldier's girl of mystery.1/

G. Orientation as to Meaning and Current State of the War

The Armed Forces, no less than other sectors of the German public, are subjected to the ideas which the Propaganda Ministry deems fit for their orientation.2/ Over and above this general cultural atmosphere, however, the soldier is exposed to special influences in the form of a daily army newspaper (Feldzeitung), daily front radio programs, movies, etc., and general political instruction by his superior officer.

The character of this political instruction has been the subject of some discussion. There is no evidence of the existence of "political commissars" on the Russian model, nor of special meetings and lectures giving "patriotic instruction" (Vaterländisches Unterricht) as in the ill-fated experiment of 1917-18 in the old German Army.3/ It has even been suggested in some quarters that "political propaganda forms no direct part of the training of the German soldier."4/

On the other hand, the normative description of the role of Company Commander given in Ellenbeck's authoritative Book ascribes considerable importance to the giving of

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1/ I Was a Nazi Flier, pp. 137-141.

2/ The increase in circulation figures of German newspapers during the first year of the war from 20 to 24.6 million copies a day was directly attributed to the needs of the Army by Emil Dovifat, Director of the Institut für Zeitungswissenschaft (Journalism) at the University of Berlin (Brüsseler Zeitung, March 3, 1941). On the other hand, Leske claims that only the Feldzeitung was allowed at his air base, and that home newspapers had to be smuggled in. (I Was a Nazi Flier, pp. 227-8).

3/ See the criticisms in Altrichter's Die seelischen Kräfte des deutschen Heeres, pp. 225-230.

4/ MID, Tentative Lessons Bulletin #64, November 4, 1940.

specifically political instruction.

"In giving attention to the intellectual life of the men of his Company, the Commander must realize to what extent the fighting spirit of his men will be influenced if they know what is at stake in this war. . .

"The daily newspaper and military news publications at the front, radio and books, soldiers' theatricals and other performances are among the agencies suited to keeping the mind active.

"But far more effective is the instruction given by the Commanding Officer in person. He will make use in that connection of whatever material happens to be available to him,1/ translating this material into the language of the soldier and bringing it closer to the minds of his men. In doing so, one must be careful to reduce the political facts to their simplest common denominator. The thing that a soldier most needs to know is that this war is a people's war, a war in which his own existence is at stake and that of the entire nation, no less than the future of his children and children's children. Once he has thoroughly got hold of this idea, he will be able to appreciate also the value of his own personal effort and contribution. Mental training for the soldier is mobilization of head and heart. At the close of each lesson--and the lessons must not be too long--the soldier must feel that he can see it all very clearly now; and he must leave in high spirits when the meeting is disbanded.2/

Still more illuminating are the confidential weekly news bulletins ostensibly prepared by each German Corps Area Command (Wehrkreiskommando) for the use of "those officers who are charged with the instruction of the troops in political and military matters."3/ Only two of these, issued by the

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1/ Very probably including the special propaganda instructions described below.

2/ Military Review, XXI, October 1941, pp. 5-12, Section 12.

3/ Leland Morris, U.S. Embassy, Berlin, to State Department, #5708, August 28, 1941, transmitting two sample "news bulletins" (COI Accessions #14533). Cf. also U.S. M/A, Berlin, #18,600, September 1, 1941. The existence of special "instruction officers" has not been confirmed.

6th Army Corps Area Command at Münster, on August 13th and 20th, 1941, have been available for examination. These two are numbered 185 and 186 respectively. If they represent, as appears to be the case, units in a weekly series, the start must have been 184 weeks previous to August 13, 1941, or about February 1938, just after the drastic "purge" of the officer's corps in which the waning independence of the Reichswehr received a setback at the hands of the Party.1/

If this reasoning is correct, then it seems likely that these weekly propaganda instructions for German army officers "charged with instructing the troops" must have been instituted at the time intensive Nazification of the army got under way. This was shortly before the invasion of Austria in March 1938, the first in a long series of aggressive politico-military actions.

In the absence of the complete series any generalization on the basis of the two issues available can be only tentative. Nevertheless the documents are worthy of notice from several points of view. In the first place, from the standpoint of propaganda, there is little to distinguish them from the informational "slant" given to the news in the newspapers and radio talks directed at the civilian population.

An analysis of the first paragraph reveals the central themes of the Nazi propaganda logic.

(1) Actors: We the Germans, look with pride on the unprecedented achievements of our brave soldiers, who are winning this campaign as they won all their previous ones, according to the plan of the great (German) strategist Clausewitz;

(2) Action: fighting a defensive war, forced on us;

(3) Object of Action: the enemy, motivated by destructive fury (Zerstörungswut) but now suffering enormous losses and defeats at the hands of our victorious armies;

(4) Motivation: (a) to protect our country, our homes and our people, (b) for the sake of eternal values; justice, freedom, order, morality and culture.

(5) Goal: Victory, annihilation of the enemy, which has been virtually achieved already (campaign in its fourth, final, phase).

1/ Cf. Rosinski, The German Army, New York, 1940, p. 236, on this "purge."

These basic terms of Nazi propaganda logic are supplemented in the course of the description of current developments by other items, all of which are intended to justify the war effort and encourage the troops by holding out the prospect of speedy victory and tangible non-military as well as military gains (productive agricultural land, raw materials, industrial installations, etc.). Enemy losses are irreplaceable; new recruits are green and cannot get along with older soldiers; various branches of the German armed forces are cooperating ably--Air Force, Infantry, Supply, Fleet in Baltic and Arctic, etc.; German soldiers, confronted with unprecedented tasks, are nevertheless successful, cheerful and indefatigable; Germany is superior in her weapons, in her other equipment, and above all in her generalship; Germany's European allies are fighting shoulder to shoulder beside her in the war against Bolshevism; the ultimate enemy is the USA, whose "octopus-like tentacles are seeking to entwine the whole world"; Germany is the protector of Europe (and South America) against these nefarious designs.

Perhaps the most striking impression made by these propaganda instructions is their logical consistency and their extraordinary detail.

An article by Hans Flemming in the army journal Deutsche Wehr, May 23, 1941, entitled "Why Political Education in the Armed Forces?", may perhaps be taken as an official justification of the soldier's political education. According to Flemming's argument Germany lost the last war in large part because her people and her army were inadequately prepared psychologically, so that they fell easy prey to "the cheap deceptions of enemy propaganda." In the present German Army this weakness has been overcome because of the efforts of the German officer in giving political instruction to his troops.

> "Whereas, in the old army, the officer had nothing to do with politics and regarded it with contempt, the officer in the new army has become intensely political . . . . The peculiar and unique victories of the present war . . . are not to be attributed to modern armament and technical training alone, nor even to superior leadership. In the final analysis the secret of these successes is to be found in the spirit of the soldier. In other words, over and above fundamental technical training has come systematic and intensive political and ideological education of the soldier."

It is interesting to recall Altrichter's discussion of "the psychology of command" in this connection. According to the classical German theory commands are to be obeyed as such and require no justification. The need for justification

arises in two cases only: when it is desired to stimulate troops with good discipline to still greater efforts, and when discipline has so deteriorated that no obedience can be secured without elaborate explanations. Whether, in the light of Altrichter's analysis, the elaborate development of a political orientation program in the Nazi German Army is to be taken as an indication of potential instability of discipline, or at least of the threat of subversive propaganda,1/ are questions which fall outside the present discussion.

The pictures alone in the daily press provide artfully constructed propaganda: the enemy is always shown in situations of defeat, while the Germans appear always as strong, resourceful, and masterful. For example, a photograph of motorcycle troops fording a river bears the caption: "Things are not always easy, but difficulties arise only to be overcome." Or, under a picture of Churchill inspecting Canadian troops in England one may read: "One wonders what each is thinking about the other!"

All important political speeches, especially Hitler's, reach the soldiers by radio or newspaper. Even specimen passages for translation into and from English, French, Italian, Polish and Russian are selected to serve a utilitarian or a propaganda purpose. These form a regular feature of the weekly Deutsche Wehr read by the army.

Finally, the Training Manual itself devotes no less than the first 27 pages to a chapter entitled "Patriotic Section: A Sketch of German History".2/ It aims to provide the dynamic philosophy of history which imbues the soldier's every act with dramatic, fateful significance.

1/ In addition to regular broadcasts the Russians are reported to have used front line loud-speakers and leaflets. See the collection of Russian propaganda leaflets (in German) in COI Accessions #15736.

2/ This is true of the two editions available for examination: 1936 for machine-gunners, 1941 for riflemen. For some reason the patriotic historical sketch is omitted from the corresponding Training Manual for the Air Force, edition of 1937.

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